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awesome-vortx-ai/emem

Vortx-AI/emem

Vortx-AI/emem Vortx-AI/emem](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/Vortx-AI/emem) πŸ¦€ ☁️ - Earth memory MCP server that gives AI agents signed geospatial facts and cite-able receipts for place-based questions. Covers elevation, land cover, surface water, vegetation, and built-up context. Public endpoint at `https://emem.dev/mcp`.

DECISION SUMMARY
Production trust decision

Allow With Approval

Production readiness
Safe for evaluation
Score
62.3
Top 29.6% of 274 scored public servers. Live-validated, non-Failing servers with at least one inspected tool, ranked on the same publicly displayed score shown on this page.
Confidence
Medium
Based on evidence completeness, recency, and validation density.
Evidence age
1.2h old
Freshness: fresh. Snapshot trustsnap_07df9782a7062316.
Top risk drivers
  • Request Association
  • Registry Consistency
  • Recovery Semantics
Recommended actions
  • Add an explicit confirm/dry-run parameter or two-step confirmation flow to write, delete, exec, and egress-capable tool…
  • Align MCP-Protocol-Version, MCP-Session-Id, DELETE teardown, and expired-session handling with the transport spec.
  • Publish /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server from your issuer and include registration endpoint when supported.
Next action
export policy, require approval for writes, add authenticated validation
exec-capable tools + no confirmation safeguards + high-risk tools need review + unauthenticated behavior not proven
Compare alternatives Export policy Open report JSON Dispute this assessment
Observed Attention
Low observed attention
AI discovery detected. This MCP server has recently appeared in AI-assisted discovery or evaluation traffic on Verify.
  • AI crawler activity
  • profile inspection
Bucketed signal based on recent segmented Verify telemetry. Crawler and evaluator activity is not treated as confirmed human demand.
Claim this profile to control the metadata agents are reading and publish verified ownership, security contact, policy metadata, badge status, and Intelligence API fields.
Status
Degraded
Score
62.3
Transport
streamable-http
Tools
16
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Risks

Security posture
Tools analyzed
16
High-risk tools
3
Destructive tools
0
Exec tools
1
Egress tools
9
Secret tools
4
Bulk-access tools
0
Risk distribution
low:4, medium:9, high:2, critical:1
Tool capability & risk inventory
ToolCapabilitiesRiskFindingsNotesEvidence
emem_tools read Low none Safeguards hinted in metadata.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "What tools exist here, and when to reach for each"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "bundle": {
        "description": "Filter by the job you are doing. Call with no arguments first to see each bundle and its size.",
        "enum": [
          "tokenisation",
          "verification",
          "agent_to_agent",
          "long_horizon",
          "robotics",
          "satellites",
          "agriculture",
          "forestry",
          "climate_risk"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "category": {
        "description": "Filter to one category. This is about the shape of the job, NOT about safety: 13 tools outside `write` declare `readOnlyHint: false` because reading a cold address can materialise or mint as a side effect, so `category: \"read\"` is not a safe-tools filter. Read each result's `annotations.readOnlyHint` for that.",
        "enum": [
          "read",
          "write",
          "verify",
          "introspect",
          "plan"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "name": {
        "description": "Return the full descriptor for exactly this tool (input schema, runnable example, annotations), e.g. `emem_ndvi`. Use this when you already know the name and want its schema without loading the whole catalog. It SHORT-CIRCUITS: when `name` is set every other argument here is ignored, so `{name, q}` is not a search within one tool. A name this responder does not carry is not an error status, you get a body with `did_you_mean` holding up to five names that share a substring with what you asked for.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "q": {
        "description": "Free-text filter over tool names, titles and trigger text, e.g. `ndvi`, `cloud`, `flood`, `verify`, `token`. Plain lowercased substring over name + title + description + trigger text, not fuzzy and not stemmed: `ndvi` hits, `vegetation index` only hits tools that spell that phrase. Combines with `shape`/`bundle`/`category`/`tier` as AND, so an over-narrow combination answers with an empty catalog rather than an error.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "shape": {
        "description": "Filter by what the answer looks like, which is usually the real question. `scalar` is one number at one address; `raster` is a gridded field over an area; `timeseries` is a value per timestep; `vector` is a learned embedding; `identity` is a canonical name for a thing; `token` is a citation handle; `proof` checks one.",
        "enum": [
          "scalar",
          "timeseries",
          "raster",
          "geometry",
          "vector",
          "identity",
          "token",
          "proof",
          "plan",
          "file",
          "catalog"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "tier": {
        "description": "Which slice to list. Defaults to `all`, so this tool shows the whole surface even when the endpoint advertises only the core loop, and an `extended` tool you find here is callable by name through tools/call whether or not your host listed it. Pass `core` to see only what a default connection advertises.",
        "enum": [
          "core",
          "extended",
          "all"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": []
}
Dispute this classification
emem_locate read network Medium arbitrary network egress freeform input surface No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Resolve place to cell64 + band inventory"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "lat": {
        "description": "WGS-84 latitude in degrees, paired with `lng`. REQUIRED with `lng` unless `place`/`q` is provided.",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "lng": {
        "description": "WGS-84 longitude in degrees, paired with `lat`. REQUIRED with `lat` unless `place`/`q` is provided.",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "name": {
        "description": "Alias for `place`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "place": {
        "description": "Free-text place name (e.g. 'Mount Everest', 'Tokyo'). REQUIRED unless `lat`+`lng` is provided. Aliases also accepted: `q`, `query`, `name`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "q": {
        "description": "Alias for `place`, accepted because OSM/Mapbox/Google Geocoding all use `q`. Provide either this or `place` (or `lat`+`lng`).",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "query": {
        "description": "Alias for `place`.",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress",
    "freeform_input_surface"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_ask network financial Critical arbitrary network egress financial transaction freeform input surface No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "title": "Ask a free-text question about a place"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "network",
    "financial"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "cell": {
        "description": "cell64 string (alternative to `place`, use when you have one from a prior emem_locate / emem_recall response). Provide this OR `place` OR `lat`+`lng`.",
        "maxLength": 23,
        "minLength": 19,
        "pattern": "^(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})(?:\\.(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})){3}$",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "include": {
        "description": "Opt-in heavy response sections. Default response is slim (~5 KB): answer + algorithm key + fact_cids + caveats. Name specific sections to include them. Ignored when verbose=true (which includes everything).",
        "items": {
          "enum": [
            "band_observations",
            "algorithm_outcomes",
            "facts_full",
            "temporal_composition",
            "foundation_embeddings",
            "scene",
            "inventory"
          ],
          "type": "string"
        },
        "type": "array"
      },
      "include_image": {
        "default": false,
        "description": "Bundle a Sentinel-2 RGB scene URL for the resolved cell. Adds ~1-2 s on first call.",
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "lat": {
        "description": "WGS-84 latitude (paired with `lng`; alternative to `place` / `cell`).",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "lng": {
        "description": "WGS-84 longitude (paired with `lat`).",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "place": {
        "description": "Free-text place name (e.g. \"Mount Fuji\", \"Ashok Nagar, Ranchi\"). REQUIRED unless `cell` or `lat`+`lng` is provided. Extract the noun phrase from the user's turn; the responder geocodes via OSM Nominatim.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "q": {
        "description": "User's natural-language question about the place (e.g. \"is this neighbourhood flood-prone\").",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "query": {
        "description": "Alias for `q`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "question": {
        "description": "Alias for `q`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "verbose": {
        "default": false,
        "description": "When true, return the full envelope: per-algorithm formula strings, temporal_recipe blocks, per-fact band_metadata duplicates, and the long _explanation prose. Default (since 2026-05-05) is false so the response fits MCP's 25 KB cap; the signed receipt + fact CIDs + algorithm keys + algorithms_cid are always retained. Pass true to get the full body when debugging.",
        "type": "boolean"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "q"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress",
    "financial_transaction",
    "freeform_input_surface"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_memory_token read Low none No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Compose a memory_token citation handle"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "band": {
        "description": "Optional band key. When set, the minted citation carries the band's tamper-provenance block (class, deterministic, tamper_evidence, trust_rank) so the receiving agent sees the trust class without a resolve round-trip.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell": {
        "description": "cell64, neither component may contain `:`.",
        "maxLength": 23,
        "minLength": 19,
        "pattern": "^(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})(?:\\.(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})){3}$",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "fact_cid": {
        "description": "52-char base32-nopad-lowercase content-id of the fact (full 32-byte blake3).",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "observed_on": {
        "description": "The fact's source capture date (YYYY-MM-DD) as `/v1/recall` reports it in `sources[].captured_at`. Supplied together with `band` it additionally mints the self-describing `descriptor_token`. A wrong date forges nothing: resolve binds the date to the signed fact and answers 409 on a mismatch.",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "cell",
      "fact_cid"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": []
}
Dispute this classification
emem_memory_token_resolve read secrets Medium secret material access freeform input surface No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Dereference a memory_token in one round-trip"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "secrets"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "token": {
        "description": "A `emem:fact:<cell64>:<fact_cid>` citation handle to dereference.",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "token"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "secret_material_access",
    "freeform_input_surface"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_echo_verify read secrets Medium secret material access freeform input surface No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Check a value against the fact it cites, before you publish it"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "secrets"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "claimed_value": {
        "description": "The value you are about to publish, as a string or a number. Send it as a STRING, character for character as you will emit it. A JSON number is stringified before the comparison, so `0.50` arrives as `0.5` and `0.2411000` as `0.2411` (measured against the live responder): the trailing digits this check exists to defend are gone before it runs. Quote `value_verbatim` from resolve as a string and echo the exact characters you will publish."
      },
      "strict": {
        "description": "Require BYTE-IDENTICAL equality. Default false, which also accepts a numerically equal value spelled differently (0.50 for 0.5). It changes exactly one outcome: the numerically-equal-but-respelled case, which passes by default and becomes `drift: \"reformatted\"` here. `rounded` and `wrong` already fail either way, so `strict` never turns a pass into a pass. It is also inert when `claimed_value` came in as a JSON number, because the respelling then happened in the JSON parser, before this tool saw it.",
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "token": {
        "description": "The citation you used. Any form resolve accepts, including a bare cid, which answers with `degraded: true`: a bare cid asserts no location, so the cell-binding check is skipped and the grade covers the value only. A cid that is not 52 characters is refused as a damaged citation rather than as a missing one, and must not be retried.",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "token",
      "claimed_value"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "secret_material_access",
    "freeform_input_surface"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_memory_bundle network Medium arbitrary network egress No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": false,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "title": "Compose a signed multi-fact memory bundle"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "purpose": {
        "description": "Optional human-readable purpose string. Included in the bundle_cid preimage so the same triples + different purposes produce distinct CIDs.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "scope": {
        "description": "Multi-tenant scope `{user_id, agent_id, run_id, org_id}`, applied to EVERY triple's underlying recall so the whole bundle cites only facts written under that four-tuple.",
        "type": "object"
      },
      "triples": {
        "description": "One to 256 (cell, band, tslot?) triples to bundle. Each entry is recalled through the standard auto-materialize path; the bundle envelope cites every resulting fact_cid. 257 or more is a typed 400: the token is O(1) in size for any N, but covering N facts costs ceil(N/256) calls, so plan round trips rather than meeting the cap mid-run.",
        "items": {
          "properties": {
            "band": {
              "description": "Band key (e.g. `indices.ndvi`, `copdem30m.elevation_mean`).",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "cell": {
              "description": "cell64 string (or free-text place name; the responder resolves before bundling).",
              "type": "string"
            },
            "tslot": {
              "description": "Optional tslot pin. Omit to use the band's natural latest tslot at the cell.",
              "type": "integer"
            }
          },
          "required": [
            "cell",
            "band"
          ],
          "type": "object"
        },
        "maxItems": 256,
        "minItems": 1,
        "type": "array"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "triples"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_entity network Medium arbitrary network egress No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "title": "Mint or get a canonical object identity"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "cell": {
        "description": "cell64 to anchor the object directly (no geocode).",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "external_ids": {
        "description": "Stable ids that drive convergence. Caller-supplied values win over geocoder-derived ones.",
        "properties": {
          "gers": {
            "description": "Overture GERS division id (strongest anchor).",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "osm": {
            "description": "OpenStreetMap object as <type>/<id>, e.g. way/717919508.",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "wikidata": {
            "description": "Wikidata QID.",
            "type": "string"
          }
        },
        "type": "object"
      },
      "kind": {
        "description": "Object class: bridge, river, farm_plot, building, admin_division, place, custom, ... Defaults to \"place\".",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "label": {
        "description": "Human name of the object, e.g. \"Golden Gate Bridge\", \"the north dam\". Required.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "lat": {
        "description": "Latitude anchoring the object to a place, paired with lng. The identity is hashed from this anchor, so two agents anchoring the same object differently mint different entities.",
        "maximum": 90,
        "minimum": -90,
        "type": "number"
      },
      "lng": {
        "description": "Longitude, paired with lat.",
        "maximum": 180,
        "minimum": -180,
        "type": "number"
      },
      "parent": {
        "description": "Optional parent entity_cid (containment).",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "place": {
        "description": "Free-text place to anchor the object (geocoded). Provide place OR cell OR lat+lng.",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "label"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_entity_resolve read secrets Medium secret material access freeform input surface Safeguards hinted in metadata.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Resolve a phrase (or emem:entity: token) to a canonical object"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "secrets"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "k": {
        "description": "Max candidates (default 10).",
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "label": {
        "description": "Alias for `text`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "near": {
        "description": "Optional place/cell to narrow to objects anchored nearby.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "text": {
        "description": "Fuzzy phrasing to resolve to an existing canonical object (e.g. \"the damaged bridge near the river\").",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "token": {
        "description": "A `emem:entity:<entity_cid>` handle to dereference directly to its signed object (bypasses the text search).",
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "secret_material_access",
    "freeform_input_surface"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_recall write network Medium arbitrary network egress Safeguards hinted in metadata.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "title": "Recall facts at a cell (auto-materializes on miss)"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "write",
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "as_of_signed_at": {
        "description": "Bi-temporal transaction-time bound. RFC 3339 string. Returns only facts whose `signed_at` \u2264 as_of_signed_at, answers `what did emem KNOW as of system-date Y`. Malformed strings are rejected with code:`invalid_signed_at_format`.",
        "format": "date-time",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "as_of_tslot": {
        "description": "Bi-temporal valid-time bound. Returns the latest fact per (cell,band) whose tslot \u2264 as_of_tslot, answers `what did this place look like AS OF date X`. Conflicts with an explicit `tslot` when as_of_tslot < tslot (rejected with code:`invalid_temporal_bound`).",
        "minimum": 0,
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "band": {
        "description": "optional single band key, convenience alias for bands:[band]. Use when you want exactly one band (e.g. 'geotessera.2020', 'modis.ndvi_mean') and would otherwise have to wrap it in an array. Both `band` and `bands` are accepted; if both are given they are merged.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "bands": {
        "description": "optional band keys to filter, e.g. ['indices.ndvi','geotessera']",
        "items": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "type": "array"
      },
      "cell": {
        "description": "cell64 string, e.g. 'damO.zb000.xUti.zde78'",
        "maxLength": 23,
        "minLength": 19,
        "pattern": "^(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})(?:\\.(?:(?:[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiouAEIOU]){2}|z[0-9a-f]{4})){3}$",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell64": {
        "description": "Alias for `cell`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "deterministic": {
        "description": "Sugar over `provenance`: true keeps only facts any third party can recompute from the cited raw source (direct_sensor + deterministic_index); false keeps the rest (attested_execution + model_output + human_curated + unclassified). Composable with `provenance` (intersection).",
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "include": {
        "description": "Opt-in response expansion. include:['provenance'] attaches each fact's tamper-provenance class, which is what `deterministic` and the `provenance` filter select ON: without it you can filter by class and never be told which class a returned fact is. include:['freshness'] attaches an advisory per-fact freshness block: a Q(\u0394t) staleness score from the band's physics decay kernel (the same one /v1/temporal_route ranks bands with), so an agent learns how stale each reading is in the call that returns it. Advisory only; it does NOT enter the receipt. include:['edges'] attaches each fact's typed temporal edges and threads their CIDs into the receipt. Absent leaves the response byte-identical to the pre-v0.0.9 recall.",
        "items": {
          "enum": [
            "freshness",
            "edges",
            "provenance"
          ],
          "type": "string"
        },
        "type": "array"
      },
      "lat": {
        "description": "Explicit latitude, an alternative to `cell`; paired with `lng`.",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "lng": {
        "description": "Explicit longitude, paired with `lat`.",
        "type": "number"
      },
      "place": {
        "description": "Free-text place name, an alternative to `cell`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "provenance": {
        "description": "Tamper-provenance filter: return only facts whose band's provenance class is in this list. `attested_execution` is a device reading trusted through its verified OS execution trace and platform attestation (not recomputable). Applied BEFORE the receipt is signed, so the receipt covers exactly the returned facts; `bands_already_attested_at_cell` stays unfiltered so you still see what else exists at the cell.",
        "items": {
          "enum": [
            "direct_sensor",
            "deterministic_index",
            "attested_execution",
            "model_output",
            "human_curated",
            "unclassified"
          ],
          "type": "string"
        },
        "type": "array"
      },
      "scope": {
        "description": "Optional multi-tenant scope {user_id, agent_id, run_id, org_id}. When at least one field is set, the recall is FILTERED to facts written under the same four-tuple (a recall scoped to {user_id:'u1'} sees only u1's facts, never another tenant's and never globally-written facts) AND the signed receipt binds the scope. Omit (or send {}) for the global, pre-v0.0.8 recall.",
        "properties": {
          "agent_id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "org_id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "run_id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "user_id": {
            "type": "string"
          }
        },
        "type": "object"
      },
      "tslot": {
        "description": "optional time slot (band-tempo-relative integer offset from emem epoch)",
        "type": "integer"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "cell"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_find_similar read network Medium arbitrary network egress No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "k-NN over the corpus by embedding"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "as_of_signed_at": {
        "description": "Bi-temporal transaction-time bound (RFC 3339). Also applied to candidates BEFORE cosine. Same Lance-bypass note as as_of_tslot.",
        "format": "date-time",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "as_of_tslot": {
        "description": "Bi-temporal valid-time bound. Applied to candidate cells BEFORE cosine scoring, a cell with no fact whose tslot \u2264 as_of_tslot under the scoring band is dropped from the candidate pool (undecidable\u2192drop). When set, the Lance ANN fast-path is bypassed (the index has no signed_at column); brute-force k-NN runs instead so as_of is honoured truthfully.",
        "minimum": 0,
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "band": {
        "default": "geotessera",
        "description": "vector band to scan (default: 128-D Tessera foundation embedding). For mode=hamming/hamming_then_rerank you can pass either the cosine band (e.g. 'geotessera') or its binary sibling ('geotessera.bin128'), the responder picks the right one.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell": {
        "description": "Alias for `key`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell64": {
        "description": "Alias for `key`.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "filter": {
        "description": "Claim-algebra predicate evaluated against every candidate before ranking. A cell with no fact for the filter's band is DROPPED rather than treated as false, so 'places like X where NDVI > 0.5' never silently includes cells with no NDVI.",
        "type": "object"
      },
      "k": {
        "default": 10,
        "description": "How many neighbours to return.",
        "maximum": 1000,
        "minimum": 1,
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "key": {
        "description": "cell64 (look up that cell's vector) or 'inline:[x,y,...]' literal vector",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "mode": {
        "default": "cosine",
        "description": "Scoring mode. cosine = fp32 over full vector (precise, ~256 B/cell scan). hamming = sign-bit popcount over the binary sibling band (~16 B/cell, ~1000\u00d7 faster, ~65% recall@10). hamming_then_rerank = triage with Hamming on 4\u00b7k candidates then re-rank by cosine, matches cosine precision at ~16\u00d7 less work.",
        "enum": [
          "cosine",
          "hamming",
          "hamming_then_rerank"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "scope": {
        "description": "Multi-tenant scope `{user_id, agent_id, run_id, org_id}`. Setting it bypasses the ANN index entirely, because that index carries no scope column, and runs the brute-force scan instead: the tenant filter is honoured truthfully, and the call is slower.",
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "key"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_memory_contradictions read Low none No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Scan for multi-attester disagreement"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "band": {
        "description": "Band key filter (e.g. `indices.ndvi`). Omit to include all bands.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell_prefix": {
        "description": "Bytewise prefix on cell64 (e.g. `defi.zb5f9`). Omit to scan the whole corpus up to the scan cap.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "limit": {
        "default": 100,
        "description": "Max contradictions to return.",
        "maximum": 1000,
        "minimum": 1,
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "min_severity": {
        "default": 0.1,
        "description": "Severity floor in [0, 1]. 0 = report every disagreement, 1 = only flagrant. Severity scoring is per band kind: scalar (max-min over band range), vector (1 - mean cosine), categorical (1 - mode share).",
        "maximum": 1,
        "minimum": 0,
        "type": "number"
      },
      "window_unix_s": {
        "description": "[lo, hi] inclusive Unix-seconds filter on attestations' signed_at, all disagreeing attestations must fall in the window.",
        "items": {
          "minimum": 0,
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "maxItems": 2,
        "minItems": 2,
        "type": "array"
      }
    },
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": []
}
Dispute this classification
emem_verify_receipt read Low none No explicit safeguard hints detected.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": false,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Server-side ed25519 receipt verifier"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "current_responder_epoch": {
        "description": "The responder key epoch you currently trust, from `/v1/manifests`. Produces an advisory `key_epoch_advisory` comparison against the receipt's epoch; a mismatch is reported, never rejected.",
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "facts": {
        "description": "The fact value(s) you intend to rely on. Each is content-addressed and checked for membership in the receipt's `fact_cids`, so a genuine receipt presented beside a tampered fact answers `valid:false` / `fact_mismatch`. Omit it and only the signature is checked, which a doctored fact survives.",
        "type": "array"
      },
      "pubkey_b32": {
        "description": "Optional explicit responder pubkey (base32). When omitted, uses the receipt's embedded pubkey/responder fields.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "receipt": {
        "description": "The signed receipt envelope (as returned by any read primitive). Must carry primitive/served_at/request_id/cells/fact_cids and either `signature` byte[] + `responder_pubkey` byte[] or their b32 string forms.",
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "receipt"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": []
}
Dispute this classification
emem_guard_verdict read network Medium arbitrary network egress Safeguards hinted in metadata.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": true,
    "title": "Check whether the citations in a draft actually verify"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "read",
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "properties": {
      "agent": {
        "description": "Optional free-text label for who is asking. Advisory only, never a trust boundary.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "claim_gating": {
        "default": false,
        "description": "Also flag measurable physical-world claims that carry NO citation (deny code CLAIM_UNGROUNDED, fix cite_observation). Off by default: it reports on the absence of a citation rather than on a failed check. The verdict names the sentence, the magnitude, and the emem band that would answer it.",
        "type": "boolean"
      },
      "messages": {
        "description": "A chat-completions-shaped transcript, read for its text. Accepted so the same body works against a self-hosted emem-guard node and against any OpenAI-shaped client. Each item is {role, content} where content is a string or an array of blocks.",
        "items": {
          "properties": {
            "content": {
              "description": "A string, or an array of {type,text} blocks."
            },
            "role": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          "type": "object"
        },
        "type": "array"
      },
      "shape": {
        "default": "native",
        "description": "Which envelope YOUR payload is in, so you never have to reshape it to ask the question: send the body your own framework produced and name its shape. native reads `texts`/`messages`; `mcp` reads a JSON-RPC tools/call or tool result; `openai` reads a moderations (`input`) or chat-completions body; `cloudevent` reads a CloudEvents 1.0 structured event; `policy` reads {input}. It matters: a CloudEvent whose citation sits at data.text is invisible to the native reader, and a check that read nothing answers `allow`, so confirm `citations_found` matches what you sent. Unrecognised values fall back to native rather than erroring. This selects how the body is READ only \u2014 the verdict always comes back in this tool's declared output shape, because a tool that declares an outputSchema owes conforming structuredContent. To get the ANSWER translated into the same envelope too (an OPA `result:{allow,deny}`, an MCP CallToolResult to substitute on a deny), call POST /v1/guard/verdict?shape=\u2026 directly.",
        "enum": [
          "native",
          "mcp",
          "openai",
          "cloudevent",
          "policy"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "texts": {
        "description": "Free text to check. Any number of pieces, in any order: a draft answer, a tool result, a whole turn.",
        "items": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "type": "array"
      }
    },
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
emem_intent write exec network High command execution arbitrary network egress Safeguards hinted in metadata.
Schema & evidence
{
  "annotations": {
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": true,
    "openWorldHint": true,
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "title": "Intent-routed planner"
  },
  "capabilities": [
    "write",
    "exec",
    "network"
  ],
  "input_schema": {
    "description": "A tagged union: `type` selects the intent and decides which OTHER fields are read. Fields belonging to a different intent are ignored, so send only the ones its row needs.",
    "properties": {
      "a": {
        "description": "is_like only: cell64 of the first place in the pair.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "b": {
        "description": "is_like only: cell64 of the second place. The answer is a cosine similarity in [-1,1] over the two cells' embeddings.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "band": {
        "description": "did_change only: which band to test, e.g. \"indices.ndvi\". One band per call; the answer is a delta over `window`, not a whole-cell diff.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "cell": {
        "description": "cell64 address, e.g. \"damO.zb000.xUti.zde78\". Required by did_change and confirm. Optional for what_is_here and ask: supply it to skip geocoding, omit it and give `place` instead.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "claim": {
        "description": "confirm only: the claim to test at `cell`, e.g. {\"band\":\"indices.ndvi\",\"op\":\"gt\",\"value\":0.4}. The answer is a verdict plus the signed facts it rests on.",
        "properties": {
          "agg": {
            "description": "How a `window` reduces: any/all quantify over the facts in it; mean/min/max compare the reduced value against `value`.",
            "enum": [
              "any",
              "all",
              "mean",
              "min",
              "max"
            ],
            "type": "string"
          },
          "band": {
            "description": "Band to test, e.g. \"indices.ndvi\".",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "op": {
            "description": "Comparison. These ten spellings and no others: `greater_than`, `>` and `gte` are all rejected. in/ni take an array `value` (member / not member). exists and absent ask only whether the band is attested here.",
            "enum": [
              "eq",
              "ne",
              "lt",
              "le",
              "gt",
              "ge",
              "in",
              "ni",
              "exists",
              "absent"
            ],
            "type": "string"
          },
          "tslot": {
            "description": "Test at one tslot. Omit for the latest. Mutually exclusive with `window`.",
            "type": "integer"
          },
          "value": {
            "description": "Right-hand side. A number for the ordering ops, an array for in/ni. REQUIRED by the parser even for exists/absent, which then ignore it \u2014 omitting it fails the whole intent with `missing field value`."
          },
          "window": {
            "description": "Test across [start, end] tslots instead of one. Requires `agg` to say how the values across the window collapse to a verdict.",
            "items": {
              "type": "integer"
            },
            "maxItems": 2,
            "minItems": 2,
            "type": "array"
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "band",
          "op",
          "value"
        ],
        "type": "object"
      },
      "description": {
        "description": "where_is: the place to resolve, e.g. \"Mount Everest\". ask: the user's question, forwarded verbatim. what_is_here: optional free text used as the question and, if `place` is absent, as the place. Ignored by the other intents.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "filter": {
        "description": "find_like only: optional claim constraining which cells may be returned. Same object as `claim` below, same ops, same required fields.",
        "properties": {
          "agg": {
            "description": "How a `window` reduces to a single verdict.",
            "enum": [
              "any",
              "all",
              "mean",
              "min",
              "max"
            ],
            "type": "string"
          },
          "band": {
            "description": "Band the neighbour must satisfy, e.g. \"indices.ndvi\".",
            "type": "string"
          },
          "op": {
            "description": "Comparison. Symbolic only: `gt`, not `greater_than` or `>`.",
            "enum": [
              "eq",
              "ne",
              "lt",
              "le",
              "gt",
              "ge",
              "in",
              "ni",
              "exists",
              "absent"
            ],
            "type": "string"
          },
          "tslot": {
            "description": "Test at one tslot. Mutually exclusive with `window`.",
            "type": "integer"
          },
          "value": {
            "description": "Right-hand side. Required by the parser even for exists/absent, which ignore it."
          },
          "window": {
            "description": "Test across [start, end] tslots instead of one. Requires `agg`.",
            "items": {
              "type": "integer"
            },
            "maxItems": 2,
            "minItems": 2,
            "type": "array"
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "band",
          "op",
          "value"
        ],
        "type": "object"
      },
      "k": {
        "description": "find_like only: how many neighbours to return. Defaults to the primitive's own default when omitted.",
        "minimum": 1,
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "key": {
        "description": "find_like only: cell64 to search from. Neighbours are ranked by embedding cosine against this cell.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "lat": {
        "description": "ask only: latitude, paired with `lng`, when you want to pin the location by coordinate rather than by name or cell64.",
        "maximum": 90,
        "minimum": -90,
        "type": "number"
      },
      "lng": {
        "description": "ask only: longitude, paired with `lat`.",
        "maximum": 180,
        "minimum": -180,
        "type": "number"
      },
      "place": {
        "description": "Free-text place name for what_is_here and ask when you have a name but no cell64, e.g. \"Ashok Nagar, Ranchi\". The responder geocodes it. Ignored when `cell` is present.",
        "type": "string"
      },
      "type": {
        "description": "Which question you are asking, and therefore which other fields apply. where_is: name a place, get its cell64 (needs `description`). what_is_here: summarise a location (needs `cell`, OR `place`/`description` to resolve it first). is_like: pairwise similarity (needs `a` and `b`). did_change: did one band move over a time window (needs `cell`, `band`, `window`). find_like: nearest neighbours to a known cell (needs `key`; optional `k`, `filter`). confirm: is a claim true at a cell (needs `claim` and `cell`). ask: free-text question about a place, runs locate + topic-route + recall server-side (needs `description`; optional `place`/`cell`/`lat`+`lng` to pin the location).",
        "enum": [
          "where_is",
          "what_is_here",
          "is_like",
          "did_change",
          "find_like",
          "confirm",
          "ask"
        ],
        "type": "string"
      },
      "window": {
        "description": "did_change only: exactly two tslots, [start, end], band-tempo-relative integers from the emem epoch (NOT unix seconds or a date string). Get valid tslots for a cell from emem_trajectory.",
        "items": {
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "maxItems": 2,
        "minItems": 2,
        "type": "array"
      }
    },
    "required": [
      "type"
    ],
    "type": "object"
  },
  "risk_flags": [
    "command_execution",
    "arbitrary_network_egress"
  ]
}
Dispute this classification
Write-action governance
Governance status
Warning
Safe to publish
βœ•
Auth boundary
oauth_or_auth_required
Blast radius
High
High-risk tools
3
Confirmation signals
emem_intent
Safeguard count
5

Status detail: 3 high-risk tool(s), 1 exec-capable tool(s); auth boundary is oauth or auth required with 5 safeguard(s) and 1 confirmation signal(s).

ToolRiskFlagsSafeguards
emem_ask Critical arbitrary network egress financial transaction freeform input surface no
emem_entity_link High arbitrary network egress secret material access no
emem_intent High command execution arbitrary network egress yes
Recommended runtime policy
Recommended runtime policy
Allow with approval
Default policy stance (medium risk ceiling, write actions require approval, no OAuth requirement). Answers "what may an agent do right now" -- a separate question from production readiness, which answers "how suitable is this server for adoption." Customize via policy export.

No policy blockers under the default policy stance.

Action-controls diff
Snapshot changed
no
Disabled-by-default candidates
none
New actions
ActionRiskFlags
No newly added actions.
Changed actions
ActionChange typesRisk
No materially changed actions.
Critical alerts
High/critical-severity alerts
6
Production verdicts degrade quickly when high or critical-severity alerts are active.

Compatibility

Client compatibility verdicts

Client compatibility only means the server shape can work with a client. Production trust decision and write-action publishing are evaluated separately so a client-compatible server can still be blocked for production.

Client compatibility: ChatGPT
Not client-compatible
Dynamic client registration materially improves connector setup.; OAuth interoperability should be strong.; The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk.
Confidence: medium (72.5)
Evidence provenance
Winner: live_validation
Supporting sources: live_validation, history, server_card
Disagreements: none
  • initialize β€’ OK
  • tools_list β€’ OK
  • transport_compliance_probe β€’ Warning
  • step_up_auth_probe β€’ Warning
  • connector_replay_probe β€’ OK β€” Frozen tool snapshots must survive refresh.
  • request_association_probe β€’ Missing β€” Roots, sampling, and elicitation should stay request-scoped.
Client compatibility: Claude
Not client-compatible
The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk.; Transport compliance failed or did not complete successfully.
Confidence: medium (72.5)
Evidence provenance
Winner: live_validation
Supporting sources: live_validation, history, server_card
Disagreements: none
  • initialize β€’ OK
  • tools_list β€’ OK
  • transport_compliance_probe β€’ Warning
Write-action publishing
Publishing blocked
action_safety_probe is in warning -- the flagged risk has not been confirmed safe. Active alert(s) affecting production readiness: Server card and live tool schemas disagree.
Confidence: medium (72.5)
Evidence provenance
Winner: live_validation
Supporting sources: live_validation, history
Disagreements: none
  • action_safety_probe β€’ Warning
Snapshot churn risk
Low
No material tool-surface churn detected in the latest comparison.
Confidence: medium (72.5)
Evidence provenance
Winner: history
Supporting sources: history, live_validation
Disagreements: none
  • tool_snapshot_probe β€’ OK
  • connector_replay_probe β€’ OK
Client compatibility gate details
ChatGPT custom connector
Not client-compatible
Dynamic client registration materially improves connector setup.; OAuth interoperability should be strong.; The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk.
Remediation checklist
  • Support dynamic client registration (DCR) to simplify connector setup.
  • Improve OAuth interoperability -- see the OAuth Interop score breakdown.
  • Limit the exposed surface to search/fetch-style read tools.
  • Remove or isolate write, delete, and exec-capable tools before using this read/search-only client profile.
  • Remove export, bulk, mutating, and high-blast-radius exposure before certifying company-knowledge use.
  • Satisfy OAuth, compatibility, and connector-refresh requirements before using the Messages API remote MCP path.
Claude remote MCP
Not client-compatible
The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk.; Transport compliance failed or did not complete successfully.
Remediation checklist
  • Limit the exposed surface to search/fetch-style read tools.
  • Remove or isolate write, delete, and exec-capable tools before using this read/search-only client profile.
  • Remove export, bulk, mutating, and high-blast-radius exposure before certifying company-knowledge use.
  • Satisfy OAuth, compatibility, and connector-refresh requirements before using the Messages API remote MCP path.
  • Resolve transport compliance issues before wider client rollout.
Write-safe publishing
Blocked
Exec-capable tools are exposed.; action_safety_probe is in warning.
Remediation checklist
  • Constrain or sandbox exec-capable tools before publishing broadly.
  • Confirm the flagged action-safety risk before treating this as write-safe.
Verdict traces
Production verdict
Safe for evaluation
The server is suitable for evaluation, but remaining gaps should be resolved before broad production use.
Confidence: medium (72.5)
Winning source: live_validation
Triggering alerts
  • server_degraded β€’ medium β€’ Latest validation is degraded
  • server_card_schema_drifted β€’ high β€’ Server card and live tool schemas disagree
Client verdict trace table
VerdictStatusChecksWinning sourceConflicts
openai_connectors Not client-compatible initialize, tools_list, transport_compliance_probe, step_up_auth_probe, connector_replay_probe, request_association_probe live_validation none
claude_desktop Not client-compatible initialize, tools_list, transport_compliance_probe live_validation none
unsafe_for_write_actions Publishing blocked action_safety_probe live_validation none
snapshot_churn_risk Low tool_snapshot_probe, connector_replay_probe history none
Publishability policy profiles
ChatGPT custom connector compatibility
Compatible with review
Dynamic client registration materially improves connector setup.; OAuth interoperability should be strong.; The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk. Compatibility is not a production approval; company knowledge and Messages API gates remain separate.
  • Search Fetch Only: No
  • Write Actions Present: Yes
  • Oauth Configured: Yes
  • Admin Refresh Required: No
  • Safe For Company Knowledge: No
  • Safe For Messages Api Remote Mcp: No
Claude remote MCP compatibility
Connector-compatible
The tool surface is not limited to search/fetch-style read tools.; This client profile expects a read/search-only tool surface, but write, delete, or exec-capable tools are present.; Not yet safe for company-knowledge use: requires a search/fetch-only surface with no export, bulk, mutating, or high-blast-radius exposure.; Not yet safe for the Messages API remote MCP path: requires OAuth, a compatible connector profile, and no pending connector-refresh risk. Compatibility is not a production approval; company knowledge and Messages API gates remain separate.
  • Search Fetch Only: No
  • Write Actions Present: Yes
  • Oauth Configured: Yes
  • Admin Refresh Required: No
  • Safe For Company Knowledge: No
  • Safe For Messages Api Remote Mcp: No
Compatibility fixtures
ChatGPT custom connector fixture
Degraded
Dynamic client registration materially improves connector setup.; OAuth interoperability should be strong.
  • remote_http_endpoint: Passes
  • oauth_discovery: Passes
  • frozen_tool_snapshot_refresh: Passes
  • request_association: Not Assessed
Anthropic remote MCP fixture
Degraded
Remote MCP transport and discovery assumptions are satisfied.
  • remote_transport: Passes
  • tool_discovery: Passes
  • auth_connect: Passes
  • safe_write_review: Degraded
Recommended for
Claude Desktop
Claude Desktop is marked compatible with score 100.
Smithery
Smithery is marked compatible with score 100.
Generic Streamable HTTP
Generic Streamable HTTP is marked compatible with score 100.

Evidence

Current trust snapshot
Snapshot ID
trustsnap_07df9782a7062316
Use this ID to compare server page, report, policy, MCP, homepage, ranking, and shortlist surfaces.
Snapshot generated
Aug 11, 2026 07:56:22 PM UTC
All page, report, policy, and MCP surfaces use this same server-detail snapshot shape.
Last validated
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:22 PM UTC
Age: 1.23h β€’ evidence age tier: Verified in last 24h β€’ display score: 62.31

Canonical machine links

Evidence confidence
Confidence score
72.5
Based on 2 recent validations, 20 captured checks, and validation age of 1.2 hours.
Live checks captured
20
More direct checks increase trust in the current verdict.
Validation age
1.2h
Lower age means fresher evidence.
Latest validation evidence
Latest summary
Degraded
Validation profile
remote_mcp
Started
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:20 PM UTC
Latency
1601.4 ms

Failures

  • oauth_authorization_server no authorization server
  • openid_configuration no authorization server
  • prompt_get JSON-RPC error -32602: missing or empty argument `place`
  • schema_divergence_probe Check completed

Checks

CheckStatusLatencyEvidence
action_safety_probe Warning n/a 3 high-risk, 1 exec-capable, 9 egress-capable, 6 declared non-read-only, non-read capabilities: write, exec, financial tool(s); auth present; safeguards=5; confirmation=emem intent.
advanced_capabilities_probe OK n/a 5 capability signal(s): completions, prompts, resource links, resources, +1 more.
connector_publishability_probe Warning n/a Publishability blockers: request association.
connector_replay_probe OK n/a Backward compatible with no breaking tool-surface changes.
determinism_probe OK 76.1 ms Check completed
initialize OK 70.7 ms Protocol 2025-03-26
interactive_flow_probe OK n/a Check completed
oauth_authorization_server Missing n/a no authorization server
oauth_protected_resource OK 70.8 ms 0 authorization server(s)
official_registry_probe Missing n/a Check completed
openid_configuration Missing n/a no authorization server
probe_noise_resilience OK 478.2 ms Fetched https://emem.dev/robots.txt
prompt_get Error 70.6 ms JSON-RPC error -32602: missing or empty argument `place`
prompts_list OK 70.5 ms 8 prompt(s) exposed
protocol_version_probe Warning n/a Claims 2025-03-26; 2 release(s) behind 2025-11-25.
provenance_divergence_probe Not_Assessed n/a Check completed
request_association_probe Missing n/a No request-association capabilities were advertised.
resource_read OK 72.4 ms 1 resource content item(s) returned
resources_list OK 70.8 ms 19 resource item(s) exposed
schema_divergence_probe Error n/a Check completed
server_card OK 71.8 ms $schema, a2a, capabilities, description
session_resume_probe Warning n/a no session id
step_up_auth_probe Warning n/a Oauth detected.
tool_snapshot_probe OK n/a Check completed
tools_list OK 76.5 ms 16 tool(s) exposed
transport_compliance_probe Warning 70.7 ms Issues: missing session id (bad protocol=400).
utility_coverage_probe OK 70.6 ms Completions advertised; no pagination evidence; tasks ok.
Known versions
  • No versions recorded.
Public server reputation
Validation success 7d
0.0
Validation success 30d
0.0
Mean time to recover
n/a
Breaking diffs 30d
0
Registry drift frequency 30d
0
Snapshot changes 30d
0
Benchmark tasks
Benchmark taskStatusEvidence
Discover tools Passes
  • initialize β€’ OK
  • tools_list β€’ OK
Read-only fetch flow Passes
  • resource_read β€’ OK
  • read_only_tool_surface β€’ OK
OAuth-required connect Passes
  • oauth_protected_resource β€’ OK
  • step_up_auth_probe β€’ Warning
Safe write flow with confirmation Degraded
  • action_safety_probe β€’ Warning
Utility coverage
Probe status
OK
Completions
advertised
Completion probe target: { "argument_name": "place", "name": "flood_history", "type": "prompt" }
Pagination
not detected
No nextCursor evidence.
Tasks
OK
Advertised: yes
Tool snapshot diff & changelog
Snapshot changed
no
Added tools
none
Removed tools
none
Required-argument changes
ToolAdded required argsRemoved required args
No required-argument changes detected.
Output-schema drift
ToolPrevious propertiesLatest properties
No output-schema drift detected.
Validation diff
Score delta
-0.52
Summary changed
no
Tool delta
0
Prompt delta
0
Auth mode changed
no
Write surface expanded
no
Protocol regressed
no
Registry drift changed
no

Regressed checks: connector_publishability_probe

Improved checks: none

Newly assessed dimensions: none

No longer assessed dimensions: none

ComponentPreviousLatestDelta
connector_publishability_score4.03.0-1.0
Registry & provenance divergence
Probe status
Not_Assessed
Direct official match
no
Drift fields
none
Cross-registry alias disagreements
Error registry_source remote_url homepage registry_identifier
FieldRegistryLive server card
Titlen/aemem
Versionn/a2.1.0
Homepagen/ahttps://emem.dev
Active alerts
  • Latest validation is degraded (medium)
    The server is reachable but at least one important behavior regressed.
  • Server card and live tool schemas disagree (high)
    Severity: high.
Aliases & registry graph
IdentifierSourceCanonicalIdentity evidenceScore
awesome-vortx-ai/emem awesome_mcp_servers yes canonical 62.3
github-vortx-ai/emem github_topic_registry no repo_slug n/a
Vortx-AI/emem glama_registry no repo_slug n/a
Alias consolidation

Strong alias identity requires matching remote URL, server-card URL, repository slug, or explicit registry cross-reference; shared provider namespace alone is not identity.

Canonical identifier
awesome-vortx-ai/emem
Duplicate aliases
2
Registry sources
awesome_mcp_servers github_topic_registry glama_registry
Source disagreements
FieldWhat differsObserved values
Registry source Multiple registries or registry sync paths claim this same canonical server. awesome_mcp_servers github_topic_registry glama_registry
Remote URL Aliases currently point at different MCP endpoints, which can indicate mirrors, stale registry data, or a real endpoint split. https://emem.dev/mcp https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/u9ncaux4l6
Homepage Registry entries disagree on the primary homepage for this server. https://emem.dev/ https://github.com/Vortx-AI/emem https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/u9ncaux4l6
Registry identifier Different registry-specific identifiers resolve to the same canonical server record here. awesome_mcp_servers:Vortx-AI/emem github_topic_registry:Vortx-AI/emem glama_registry:u9ncaux4l6

Fix it

Why this score?
Access & Protocol
26/44
Connectivity, auth, and transport expectations for common clients.
Interface Quality
41/56
How well the tool/resource interface communicates and behaves under automation.
Security Posture
26/36
How safely the exposed tool surface handles destructive actions, egress, execution, secrets, and risky inputs.
Reliability & Trust
24/24
Operational stability, consistency, and trustworthiness over time.
Discovery & Governance
13/28
How well the server is documented, listed, and governed in public registries.
Adoption & Market
5/8
Adoption clues and public evidence that the server is intended for external use.
Algorithmic score breakdown
Auth Operability
2/4
Measures whether auth discovery and protected access behave predictably for clients.
Error Contract Quality
2/4
Grades machine-readable error structure, status alignment, and remediation hints.
Rate-Limit Semantics
2/4
Checks whether quota/throttle responses are deterministic and automation-friendly.
Schema Completeness
3/4
Completeness of tool descriptions, parameter docs, examples, and schema shape.
Backward Compatibility
4/4
Stability score across tool schema/name drift relative to prior validations.
SLO Health
4/4
Availability, latency, and burst-failure profile across recent validation history.
Security Hygiene
4/4
HTTPS posture, endpoint hygiene, and response-surface hardening checks.
Task Success
4/4
Can an agent reliably initialize, enumerate tools, and execute core MCP flows?
Trust Confidence
4/4
Confidence-adjusted reliability score that penalizes low evidence volume.
Abuse/Noise Resilience
4/4
How well the server preserves core behavior in the presence of noisy traffic patterns.
Prompt Contract
3/4
Quality of prompt metadata, argument shape, and prompt discoverability for clients.
Resource Contract
4/4
How completely resources and resource templates describe URIs, types, and usage shape.
Discovery Metadata
3/4
Homepage, docs, icon, repository, support, and license coverage for directory consumers.
Registry Consistency
1/4
Agreement between stored registry metadata, live server-card data, and current validation output.
Installability
4/4
How cleanly a real client can connect, initialize, enumerate tools, and proceed through auth.
Session Semantics
4/4
Determinism and state behavior across repeated MCP calls, including sticky-session surprises.
Tool Surface Design
3/4
Naming clarity, schema ergonomics, and parameter complexity across the tool surface.
Result Shape Stability
3/4
Stability of declared output schemas across validations, with penalties for drift or missing shapes.
OAuth Interop
1/4
Depth and client compatibility of OAuth/OIDC metadata beyond the minimal protected-resource check.
Recovery Semantics
1/4
Whether failures include actionable machine-readable next steps such as retry or upgrade guidance.
Maintenance Signal
2/4
Versioning, update recency, and historical validation cadence that indicate active stewardship.
Adoption Signal
2/4
Directory presence and distribution clues that suggest the server is intended for external use.
Freshness Confidence
4/4
Confidence that recent validations are current enough and dense enough to trust operationally.
Transport Fidelity
4/4
Whether declared transport metadata matches the observed endpoint behavior and response formats.
Spec Recency
2/4
How close the server’s claimed MCP protocol version is to the latest known public revision.
Session Resume
3/4
Whether Streamable HTTP session identifiers and resumed requests behave cleanly for real clients.
Step-Up Auth
3/4
Whether OAuth metadata and WWW-Authenticate challenges support granular, incremental consent instead of broad upfront scopes.
Transport Compliance
2/4
Checks session headers, protocol-version enforcement, session teardown, and expired-session behavior.
Utility Coverage
3/4
Signals support for completions, pagination, and task-oriented utility surfaces that larger clients increasingly expect.
Advanced Capability Coverage
1/4
Coverage of newer MCP surfaces like roots, sampling, elicitation, structured output, and related metadata.
Connector Publishability
3/4
How ready the server looks for client catalogs and managed connector programs.
Tool Snapshot Churn
4/4
Stability of the tool surface across recent validations, including add/remove and output-shape drift.
Connector Replay
4/4
Whether a previously published frozen connector snapshot would remain backward compatible after the latest tool refresh.
Request Association
0/4
Whether roots, sampling, and elicitation appear tied to active client requests instead of arriving unsolicited on idle sessions.
Interactive Flow Safety
4/4
Whether prompts and docs steer users toward safe auth flows instead of pasting secrets directly.
Action Safety
2/4
Risk-weighted view of destructive, exec, egress, and confirmation semantics across the tool surface.
Official Registry Presence
3/4
Whether the server appears directly or indirectly in the official MCP registry.
Safety Transparency
3/4
Clarity of docs, auth disclosure, support links, and other trust signals visible to integrators.
Tool Capability Clarity
4/4
How clearly the tool surface communicates whether each action reads, writes, deletes, executes, or exports data.
Destructive Operation Safety
3/4
Penalizes delete/revoke/destroy style tools unless auth and safeguards reduce blast radius.
Egress / SSRF Resilience
2/4
Assesses arbitrary URL fetch, crawl, webhook, and remote-request exposure on the tool surface.
Execution / Sandbox Safety
3/4
Evaluates shell, code, script, and command-execution exposure and whether that surface appears contained.
Data Exfiltration Resilience
3/4
Assesses export, dump, backup, and bulk-read behavior against the surrounding auth and safeguard signals.
Least Privilege Scope
1/4
Rewards scoped auth metadata and penalizes broad or missing scopes around privileged tools.
Secret Handling Hygiene
2/4
Assesses secret-bearing tools, token leakage risk, and whether the public surface avoids obvious secret exposure.
Supply Chain Signal
1/4
Public metadata signal for repository, changelog, license, versioning, and recency that supports supply-chain trust.
Input Sanitization Safety
3/4
Penalizes risky freeform string inputs when schemas do not constrain URLs, code, paths, queries, or templates.
Tool Namespace Clarity
4/4
Measures naming uniqueness and ambiguity across the tool namespace to reduce collision and confusion risk.

1 component(s) not assessed for this run: Provenance Divergence

Experimental candidate components
Personal Data Exposure
8.5
Experimental candidate, weight 0. Export and bulk-access evidence only; no impact on totals, verdicts, rankings, or gates.
Actionable remediation
SeverityRemediationWhy it mattersRecommended action
High Add confirmation and dry-run semantics for risky actions High-risk write, delete, exec, or egress tools should communicate safeguards clearly. Add an explicit confirm/dry-run parameter or two-step confirmation flow to write, delete, exec, and egress-capable tools before they can make destructive changes.
Playbook
  • For each high-risk tool (delete, exec, or network-egress capable), add a `confirm`/`dry_run` parameter or a two-step confirmation flow.
  • Document the safeguard in the tool's description so clients and agents know confirmation is required before execution.
  • Revalidate and confirm `action_safety_probe` reports the safeguard as detected.
High Align session and protocol behavior with Streamable HTTP expectations Clients increasingly rely on MCP-Protocol-Version, session teardown, and expired-session semantics. Align MCP-Protocol-Version, MCP-Session-Id, DELETE teardown, and expired-session handling with the transport spec.
Playbook
  • Return `Mcp-Session-Id` and `Mcp-Protocol-Version` headers consistently on streamable HTTP responses.
  • Honor `DELETE` session teardown and return `404` when a deleted session is reused.
  • Reject invalid protocol-version headers with `400 Bad Request`.
High Publish OAuth authorization-server metadata Clients need authorization-server metadata to discover issuer, endpoints, and DCR support. Publish /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server from your issuer and include registration_endpoint when supported.
Playbook
  • Publish `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` from the issuer.
  • Add `registration_endpoint` if DCR is supported.
  • Verify issuer, authorization, token, and jwks metadata are all reachable.
High Respond to server card and live tool schemas disagree Severity: high.
High Sync the published server card's tool schemas with the live tool surface The server card and live tools/list disagree on parameter names, required sets, or types -- clients that trust the published card will construct invalid calls. Regenerate the published server card from the live tool schemas (or vice versa) so the two agree -- see the schema divergence detail on this run for exactly which fields disagree.
Playbook
  • Diff the published `/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json` tool schemas against a live `tools/list` response.
  • Fix parameter name mismatches, required-set mismatches, and type mismatches per tool.
  • Regenerate or hand-sync the server card whenever the live tool schemas change -- treat drift as a release blocker, not a documentation nit.
Medium Adopt a current MCP protocol revision Older protocol revisions reduce compatibility with newer clients and registry programs. Advertise a current MCP protocol revision (2025-06-18 or later) in both the initialize response and the MCP-Protocol-Version header.
Playbook
  • Update the server's advertised protocol version to a current MCP revision (2025-06-18 or later).
  • Return the negotiated version consistently in both the `initialize` response and the `MCP-Protocol-Version` header.
  • Revalidate and confirm `protocol_version_probe` reports `ok`.
Medium Close connector-publishing gaps Connector catalogs care about protocol recency, session behavior, auth clarity, and tool-surface stability.
Medium Document minimal scopes and return cleaner auth challenges Modern clients expect granular scopes and step-up auth signals such as WWW-Authenticate scope hints. Return granular scopes and WWW-Authenticate challenge hints instead of forcing overly broad auth upfront.
Playbook
  • Advertise the narrowest viable scopes in OAuth metadata.
  • Return `WWW-Authenticate` challenges with scope or insufficient-scope hints when additional consent is needed.
  • Revalidate with both public discovery and auth-required flows.
Medium Publish OpenID configuration OIDC metadata improves token validation and client compatibility. Expose /.well-known/openid-configuration with issuer, jwks_uri, and supported grants.
Playbook
  • Serve `/.well-known/openid-configuration` with `issuer`, `jwks_uri`, `authorization_endpoint`, and `token_endpoint`.
  • List supported grant types in `grant_types_supported` and scopes in `scopes_supported`.
  • Revalidate and confirm the `openid_configuration` check returns `ok`.
Medium Respond to latest validation is degraded The server is reachable but at least one important behavior regressed. Resolve the regressed checks and review the latest validation diff.
Medium Support resumable HTTP sessions cleanly Modern MCP clients increasingly expect resumable session behavior on streamable HTTP transports. Persist session state keyed by Mcp-Session-Id and honor Last-Event-ID on GET reconnects so clients can resume a dropped Streamable HTTP session.
Playbook
  • Persist session state keyed by `Mcp-Session-Id` so a client can reconnect after a dropped connection.
  • Honor `Last-Event-ID` on GET reconnects to replay missed SSE events instead of erroring.
  • Revalidate and confirm `session_resume_probe` no longer returns `warning`.
Low Publish or reconcile the server in the official MCP registry Official registry presence improves discovery confidence and cross-source consistency.
Point loss breakdown
ComponentCurrentPoints missing
Request Association 0/4 -4.0
Registry Consistency 1/4 -3.0
Recovery Semantics 1/4 -3.0
OAUTH Interop 1/4 -3.0
Least Privilege Scope 1/4 -3.0
Dependency Supply Chain Signal 1/4 -3.0
Advanced Capability Coverage 1/4 -3.0
Transport Compliance 2/4 -2.0
Spec Recency 2/4 -2.0
Secret Handling Hygiene 2/4 -2.0
Rate Limit Semantics 2/4 -2.0
Maintenance Signal 2/4 -2.0
Compatibility profiles
OpenAI Connectors
77.8
partial (7 of 9 requirements met)
Dynamic client registration materially improves connector setup.; OAuth interoperability should be strong.
Connector URL: https://emem.dev/mcp
# Complete OAuth in the client when prompted.
# Server: awesome-vortx-ai/emem
Claude Desktop
100.0
compatible (6 of 6 requirements met)
No major blockers detected.
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "emem": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["mcp-remote", "https://emem.dev/mcp"]
    }
  }
}
Smithery
100.0
compatible (5 of 5 requirements met)
No major blockers detected.
smithery mcp add "https://emem.dev/mcp"
Generic Streamable HTTP
100.0
compatible (6 of 6 requirements met)
No major blockers detected.
curl -sS https://emem.dev/mcp -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"mcp-verify","version":"0.1.0"}}}'

Governance

MCP TrustOps

TrustOps turns this report into operational controls: validation targets and SLAs, authenticated validation, semantic benchmarks, policy exports, alert subscriptions, badges, cost/compliance metadata, and runtime routing. Fresh trusted index decisions stay separate from long-tail inventory so stale scores do not masquerade as current evidence.

Evidence age tier
Verified in last 24h
Policy evidence-age limit (a runtime constraint, distinct from the public 24h freshness window and from a plan's validation target/SLA): 168.0h β€’ confidence-weighted score (display score discounted for evidence age and confidence -- an internal TrustOps input, not the public score): 45.2 β€’ evidence too old to display: βœ•
Policy exports
Formats: json, rego, yaml, github_action, gateway_config, client_report
Runtime routing
/v1/decide
Returns allowed tools, blocked tools, approval requirement, and reason.
Hosted runtime
Deploy trusted servers from GitHub with secrets, egress controls, releases, rollback, and audit events.
Authenticated validation
βœ•
Premium publisher feature: paid authenticated runs verify scopes, write-action safeguards, and authorized tool execution.
Active trust badges
none
Semantic benchmarks
available
Templates cover GitHub, database, healthcare, web search, and CRM least-privilege jobs.
Supply chain
metadata signal
Deep scan checks are marked separately from public metadata signals.
Compliance metadata
βœ•
Terms, privacy, SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR, retention, deletion, and audit-log fields are tracked as enterprise metadata.
Alert subscription types
Status changes Score drops or recovers Evidence-age policy breach Validation schema drift OAuth or auth behavior changes Tool surface changes New or changed write tool Supply-chain signal changes Legal or compliance metadata changes
MCP Runtime hosting

Verify Hosted MCP turns a trusted server report into a managed remote MCP endpoint with GitHub deployment provenance, sandbox policy, encrypted secrets, release history, rollback, and audit/usage events.

Activation readiness
βœ•
Trusted hosted runtimes require fresh validation, a passing server state, a remote endpoint, and a minimum score.
Minimum tier
TrustOps
Publisher claim plus paid TrustOps tier are required before secrets or releases can be created.
Hosted endpoint
/hosted/{namespace}/{name}/mcp
The endpoint enforces egress allowlists and records audit/usage events.
Blockers
score_below_hosting_threshold blocked_by_active_alerts unsafe_write_action_surface
DeploymentStatusEndpointRelease
No hosted runtime deployments yet.
Authenticated validation sessions

Public validation is free. Authenticated validation is paid and proves scoped behavior, write-action safeguards, and authenticated tool execution.

Latest profile
remote_mcp
Authenticated session used
βœ•
Public score isolation
βœ“
Preview endpoint
/v1/verify
CI preview endpoint
/v1/ci/preview
Install snippets
Openai Connectors
Connector URL: https://emem.dev/mcp
# Complete OAuth in the client when prompted.
# Server: awesome-vortx-ai/emem
Claude Desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "emem": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["mcp-remote", "https://emem.dev/mcp"]
    }
  }
}
Smithery
smithery mcp add "https://emem.dev/mcp"
Generic Http
curl -sS https://emem.dev/mcp -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"mcp-verify","version":"0.1.0"}}}'
Agent access & tool surface
Live server tools
emem_tools emem_locate emem_ask emem_memory_token emem_memory_token_resolve emem_echo_verify emem_memory_bundle emem_entity
Showing 8 of 16 tools.
Observed from the latest live validation against https://emem.dev/mcp. This is the target server surface, not Verify's own inspection tools.
Live capability counts
16 tools β€’ 8 prompts β€’ 19 resources
Counts come from the latest tools/list, prompts/list, and resources/list checks.
Inspect with Verify
search fetch search_servers recommend_servers get_server_report compare_servers
Use Verify itself to search, recommend, compare, and fetch the full report for awesome-vortx-ai/emem.
Direct machine links

History

Validation history
7 day score delta
n/a
30 day score delta
n/a
Recent healthy ratio
0%
Freshness
1.2h
TimestampStatusScoreLatencyTools
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:22 PM UTC Degraded 62.3 1601.4 ms 16
Aug 11, 2026 02:39:42 PM UTC Degraded 62.8 1487.0 ms 16
Aug 11, 2026 10:38:37 AM UTC Degraded 62.3 1527.6 ms not fetched
Aug 11, 2026 06:38:28 AM UTC Degraded 60.8 1504.8 ms not fetched
Aug 11, 2026 02:34:16 AM UTC Degraded 62.8 1617.2 ms not fetched
Aug 10, 2026 10:04:18 PM UTC Degraded 59.7 1720.3 ms not fetched
Aug 10, 2026 06:04:02 PM UTC Degraded 62.8 1773.6 ms not fetched
Aug 10, 2026 02:01:55 PM UTC Degraded 62.8 1636.3 ms not fetched
Validation timeline
ValidatedSummaryScoreProtocolAuth modeToolsHigh-risk toolsChanges
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:22 PM UTC Degraded 62.3 2025-03-26 oauth_supported 16 3 none
Aug 11, 2026 02:39:42 PM UTC Degraded 62.8 2025-03-26 oauth_supported 16 3 none
Aug 11, 2026 10:38:37 AM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 11, 2026 06:38:28 AM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 11, 2026 02:34:16 AM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 10, 2026 10:04:18 PM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 10, 2026 06:04:02 PM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 10, 2026 02:01:55 PM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 10, 2026 10:00:56 AM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Aug 10, 2026 06:00:34 AM UTC Degraded n/a unknown unknown not fetched 0 none
Recent validation runs
Recent validation runs for this MCP server
StartedStatusSummaryLatencyChecks
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:20 PM UTC Completed Degraded 1601.4 ms action_safety_probe, advanced_capabilities_probe, connector_publishability_probe, connector_replay_probe, determinism_probe, initialize, interactive_flow_probe, oauth_authorization_server, oauth_protected_resource, official_registry_probe, openid_configuration, probe_noise_resilience, prompt_get, prompts_list, protocol_version_probe, provenance_divergence_probe, request_association_probe, resource_read, resources_list, schema_divergence_probe, server_card, session_resume_probe, step_up_auth_probe, tool_snapshot_probe, tools_list, transport_compliance_probe, utility_coverage_probe
Aug 11, 2026 02:39:41 PM UTC Completed Degraded 1487.0 ms action_safety_probe, advanced_capabilities_probe, connector_publishability_probe, connector_replay_probe, determinism_probe, initialize, interactive_flow_probe, oauth_authorization_server, oauth_protected_resource, official_registry_probe, openid_configuration, probe_noise_resilience, prompt_get, prompts_list, protocol_version_probe, provenance_divergence_probe, request_association_probe, resource_read, resources_list, schema_divergence_probe, server_card, session_resume_probe, step_up_auth_probe, tool_snapshot_probe, tools_list, transport_compliance_probe, utility_coverage_probe
Aug 11, 2026 10:38:35 AM UTC Completed Degraded 1527.6 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 11, 2026 06:38:27 AM UTC Completed Degraded 1504.8 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 11, 2026 02:34:15 AM UTC Completed Degraded 1617.2 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 10, 2026 10:04:17 PM UTC Completed Degraded 1720.3 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 10, 2026 06:04:00 PM UTC Completed Degraded 1773.6 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 10, 2026 02:01:54 PM UTC Completed Degraded 1636.3 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 10, 2026 10:00:55 AM UTC Completed Degraded 1315.0 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Aug 10, 2026 06:00:32 AM UTC Completed Degraded 1617.8 ms not fetched (not counted in confidence)
Incident & change feed
TimestampEventDetails
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:22 PM UTC Latest validation: degraded Score 62.3 with status degraded.
Aug 11, 2026 06:42:22 PM UTC Score changed Score delta -0.5 versus the previous run.
Aug 05, 2026 11:02:28 AM UTC Score corrected (post-1.0.503 remediation, R1 zero-anchoring) Prior: 69.22. Corrected: 67.31.

Technical details

Raw evidence view
Show raw JSON evidence

Large evidence payload summarized to keep this page fast. Full raw evidence remains available from the JSON report.

{
  "checks": {
    "count": 27,
    "items": {
      "action_safety_probe": {
        "auth_present": true,
        "safeguard_count": 5,
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "advanced_capabilities_probe": {
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "connector_publishability_probe": {
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "connector_replay_probe": {
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "determinism_probe": {
        "latency_ms": 76.09,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "initialize": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 70.67,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "interactive_flow_probe": {
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "oauth_authorization_server": {
        "reason": "no_authorization_server",
        "status": "missing"
      },
      "oauth_protected_resource": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 70.78,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "official_registry_probe": {
        "status": "missing"
      },
      "openid_configuration": {
        "reason": "no_authorization_server",
        "status": "missing"
      },
      "probe_noise_resilience": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 478.2,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "prompt_get": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 70.56,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "error"
      },
      "prompts_list": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 70.47,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "protocol_version_probe": {
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "provenance_divergence_probe": {
        "status": "not_assessed"
      },
      "request_association_probe": {
        "reason": "no_request_association_capabilities_advertised",
        "status": "missing"
      },
      "resource_read": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 72.4,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "resources_list": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 70.83,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "schema_divergence_probe": {
        "status": "error"
      },
      "server_card": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 71.82,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok",
        "tool_count": 0
      },
      "session_resume_probe": {
        "reason": "no_session_id",
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "step_up_auth_probe": {
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "tool_snapshot_probe": {
        "status": "ok"
      },
      "tools_list": {
        "http_status": 200,
        "latency_ms": 76.52,
        "payload_omitted": true,
        "status": "ok",
        "tool_count": 16,
        "tool_names_preview": [
          "emem_tools",
          "emem_locate",
          "emem_ask",
          "emem_memory_token",
          "emem_memory_token_resolve",
          "emem_echo_verify",
          "emem_memory_bundle",
          "emem_entity",
          "emem_entity_resolve",
          "emem_entity_link",
          "emem_recall",
          "emem_find_similar",
          "emem_memory_contradictions",
          "emem_verify_receipt",
          "emem_guard_verdict",
          "emem_intent"
        ]
      },
      "transport_compliance_probe": {
        "latency_ms": 70.66,
        "protocol_header_present": true,
        "status": "warning"
      },
      "utility_coverage_probe": {
        "latency_ms": 70.56,
        "status": "ok"
      }
    },
    "omitted_count": 0
  },
  "failures": {
    "count": 4,
    "items": {
      "oauth_authorization_server": {},
      "openid_configuration": {},
      "prompt_get": {},
      "schema_divergence_probe": {}
    },
    "omitted_count": 0
  },
  "message": "Raw evidence is summarized in HTML to keep server detail pages fast. Use the JSON report or evidence API for the full payload.",
  "remote_url": "https://emem.dev/mcp",
  "server_card": {
    "name": null,
    "raw_payload_omitted": false,
    "version": null
  },
  "server_identifier": "awesome-vortx-ai/emem",
  "truncated": true
}
Capabilities
Use-case taxonomy
development search web security
Transport compliance drilldown
Probe status
Warning
Transport
streamable-http
Session header
no
Protocol header
yes
Bad protocol response
400
DELETE teardown
n/a
Expired session retry
n/a
Last-Event-ID visible
no

Issues: missing_session_id

Request association
Status
Missing
Advertised capabilities
none
Observed idle methods
none
Violating methods
none
Probe HTTP status
n/a
Issues
none
Connector replay
Status
OK
Backward compatible
βœ“
Would break after refresh
βœ•
Added tools
none
Removed tools
none
Additive output changes
none
Required-argument replay breaks
ToolAdded required argsRemoved required args
No required-argument replay breaks detected.
Output-schema replay breaks
ToolRemoved propertiesAdded properties
No output-schema replay breaks detected.